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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between philosophy and policy in the context of
three California policies, Determinate Sentencing, Three Strikes, and Realignment. The
philosophy portion includes theories of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation,
focusing on the tensions and conflicts within them.
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Introduction
Socrates makes a radical claim in Plato’s Apology that individuals cannot
voluntarily commit wrongdoing so only the irrational are capable of performing a
criminal act.1 During Meletus’ cross-examination, Socrates states,
“and if I corrupt involuntarily, the law is not that you bring me here for
such involuntary wrongs, but that you take me aside in private to teach and
admonish me. For it is clear that if I learn, I will at least stop doing what I
do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and teaching me,
and you were not willing to, but instead you brought me in here, where the
law is to bring in those in need of punishment not learning.”2
Socrates distinguishes between punishment and education as two mutually
exclusive ends, demonstrating the radical nature of his belief. The element of
involuntariness is at odds with most modern theories and institutions of punishment,
which are dependent on one making a rational choice. Socrates holds that education is
the only plausible response to crime, yet this is seemingly incompatible in the United
States, a large nation with thousands of dangerous criminals. Even if Socrates’
alternative had the possibility of working, it is easy to imagine citizens and officials
rejecting it due to their deep-seated beliefs about the necessity of punishment and fear of
violence. Theories of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation provide the rationales for
current public policy, often in a mixed fashion. Having a deeper understanding of the
assumptions behind the theories and their philosophical origins will provide insight into
Socrates’ dilemma in a modern setting. This thesis will explore the question of how to
justify punishment despite the radical observation about the involuntariness of crime in
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the context of modern California policy. Relying on this Socratic insight will provide a
unique perspective on the on-going debate over the varying theories.
Lorraine Smith Pangle, in her article “Moral and Criminal Responsibility in
Plato’s Laws” discusses Plato’s criminal code in the Laws, focusing on the potential for
radical and philosophical contributions to theories of modern punishment.3 She
highlights Plato’s argument “that no code of legislation, however wise, can instill in the
majority of citizens the virtue that in Socrates’ soul sprang from philosophic
independence—the self-sufficiency, the strength to face necessity calmly, the humane
spirit of moderation.”4 Despite the laws’ insufficiency in these respects, they can still
serve as a reminder of higher accounts of virtue, attempting to provide moral teaching
and to dissuade individuals from criminal life. Pangle discusses the Athenian Stranger’s
critique of retribution and deterrence that they are ignoble and turns to the Socratic
recommendation of education from Plato’s Apology. Education requires a full
reformation of the criminal, which in turn depends on the individual’s acceptance of the
treatment. Ultimately, this requirement of rehabilitation poses important questions about
the theoretical background and effectiveness of the theory.
Pangle’s solution from analyzing Plato and Socrates’ arguments is that there are
important applications of their philosophical arguments to modern punishment. Often
rehabilitation or education is justified using appeals to pragmatism and compassion, but
Plato has a deeper account emphasizing the well-being and soul of the offender and
ultimately the community. Additionally, Pangle draws on an important conflict between
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restorative and punitive aims of the criminal justice system. It is impossible to
completely remove the punitive element, given the violent nature of crimes and demands
of victims. The inconsistency of justifying retributive punishment ought to be accepted,
since it is often the only recourse when alternative treatment fails. Finally, she argues
that modern restorative justice movements lack a notion of what ought to be restored, and
Plato and Socrates can fill that gap through their deep understandings of the virtue and
self-sufficiency of individuals. Pangle is promising for dealing with this Socratic
dilemma since she does not merely critique punishment, but offers solutions for how the
philosophical and sometimes radical criticisms can be integrated with modern
punishment and rehabilitation to bolster them. She raises important questions about the
compatibility of punishment and treatment, inconsistency of retribution, and goal of
rehabilitation which I will discuss in subsequent chapters detailing the respective
theories.
Retribution
Retribution connotes the common phrase, “the punishment should fit the crime.”
Despite its commonplace nature, determining which punishments “fit” can be incredibly
complex. As a chief contributor to the theory of retribution, Immanuel Kant explains the
purpose of punishment, "judicial punishment can never be merely a means of furthering
some extraneous good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but must always be
imposed on the criminal simply because he has committed a crime.”5 Kant’s retributive
account purports that individuals should be punished based on dessert, with the offenders
receiving punishments proportional to their crimes. The ideal system respects the choices
5
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of criminals by assigning the appropriate consequences and recognizing their
responsibility. The hypothetical balance can be restored for the victims, society, and the
criminals. This balance refers to a principled account of a moral order rather than
“extraneous good” such as public safety or other consequences. It is generally agreed
upon that known serial murderers deserve severe punishments, but the harder cases
involve lesser offenders, the mentally ill, and problems with the penal system itself.
Further, opponents argue that is difficult to justify punishment solely based on retribution
without considering what is best for society as a whole.
Deterrence
Deterrence is premised upon a rational calculation that the harms of punishment
outweigh the good derived from a criminal act. According to deterrence theorists,
developing law based on that assumption leads to lower crime rates and increased public
safety. Cesare Beccaria argues that “the foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish
crimes” is “the necessity of defending the repository of the public well-being from the
usurpations of individuals.”6 Beccaria appeals to the government or “sovereign’s”
obligation to protect the “public well-being,” highlighting a chief motivation behind
crime policy. Despite deterrence theorists’ admirable goals, influencing criminals’
irrational motivations and actions can be a barrier to using the law to change behavior.
Moreover, determining which punishments are sufficient to affect one’s reasoning before
a crime can be nearly impossible
Rehabilitation
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In 1899, Illinois established a separate court for juvenile offenders for
rehabilitative purposes. The goal of the new court and its sanctions was to treat offenders
through a compulsory program with education and other reformative components.7 The
rehabilitative alternative was premised upon the idea that juveniles are not fully rational
and therefore malleable to change. The separate juvenile model still contains some of its
original treatment methods, but concerns about due process and the danger of violent
juveniles has changed the system from its original design. Karl Menninger applies a
similar theory to both adult and juvenile offenders, maintaining that crime is an illness,
which must be treated rather than punished. If Menninger’s theory holds true, prisons
would be cruel and ineffective as a response to crime. Already, one can notice flaws and
tensions within the theories, making the question of how to adjudicate among them
incredibly relevant and complex.
Determinate Sentencing
California’s Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act arose as an alternative
approach to indeterminate sentencing. Indeterminate sentencing involves more judicial
discretion in assigning sentence lengths. It often emphasizes rehabilitation as the goal,
meaning that a more indefinite sentence is appropriate. The length of the sentence
depends on the judges’ assessment of the offender’s reformation in prison. Determinate
sentencing provides three options for judges, a mitigated, presumptive, and aggravated
sentence. The shift from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing represents a
transition from a policy partially based on rehabilitation to one based on retributive
proportionality. This shift is in part derived from concerns of the effectiveness of
7
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punishment, echoing utilitarian philosophies. I selected this case study of determinate
sentencing in California because it is a large state often on the forefront of policy changes
in the United States, especially in criminal justice.
Three Strikes
Three Strikes and You’re Out in California was one of the first state laws enacting
more severe penalties for repeat felons. Compared to other states, it applied to a wider
range of felons. The statute was adopted by the legislature but also proposed by the
California voters through Proposition 184. The populist advocacy of Three Strikes
provides an intriguing perspective on the potential philosophical ideas motivating the
people. Three Strikes exemplifies a commitment to incapacitation above all other
theories. Potentially, there is some sense of retribution in greater penalties for repeat
offenders.
Realignment
California’s prison Realignment is the diversion of certain non-serious and nonviolent felons from state prison to county jails. The shift was motivated by the
unconstitutional conditions in California state prisons due to prison overcrowding. Some
county jails are experimenting with more treatment-oriented responses for lower-level
felons. Proponents of Realignment recognize the worry of shorter sentences and
therefore emphasize that Realignment does not alter sentence length. Realignment is
unique to California and is an important case study for this thesis because it reflects the
compromise of all three theories of punishment. All three case studies highlight tensions
and conflicts of the theories in the context of major California policies.
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Chapter One: Retribution
In this chapter, I will outline Kant’s theory of retribution in order to establish an
understanding of retribution for the subsequent criticisms of the theory and application to
public policies that this thesis explores. The interaction among retribution, anger, and
emotions holds importance in some versions of justifying retributive theory, but also in
contributing to criticism. After discussing Kant’s arguments, I will present some
critiques and discuss Walter Berns’ work on anger and retribution, analyzing how the two
factors intersect and complement each other’s arguments.
Kant opens his theory of laws by focusing on what he calls the Public Right, “a
system of laws for a people” which provides “a rightful condition under a will uniting
them, a constitution (constitutio), so that they may enjoy what is laid down as right.”8
The rightful condition refers to the two requirements that “people must be able to acquire
means through their deeds, and stand up for their rights.”9 Therefore, the rightful
condition refers to the normative purpose of the law premised upon securing individual
freedoms and rights. The explicitly normative purpose of the law distinguishes Kant
from other theorists who hold that the law is merely necessary because he does not base
the need for laws on a natural fact about humans, such as the need to establish order and
bring peace to a violently divided and autonomous state of nature. Although Kant does
not make the same assumptions about the brutish human nature, he notes the necessity of
laws since “before a public lawful condition is established, individual men, peoples, and
states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right
8
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to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion
about this.”10 He therefore argues for law’s necessity but not because of an inherently
brutal human nature like Hobbes and Locke.
After establishing the justification for laws designed to secure the rightful
condition, Kant establishes why punishment ought to be retributive rather than utilitarian
or fulfilling some end. He argues that punishment must only be inflicted on the guilty
because acting otherwise would result in one being used as a means to an end, and
persons have an innate nature rendering such treatment unjust. Since punishment
involves the use of coercion, clearly some different treatment is permissible against the
convicted, as Kant notes that one “can be condemned to lose his civil personality.”11
Another restriction against utilitarian purposes of punishment is Kant’s opposition to “the
Pharisaical saying, ‘it is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish.’”12
Further, the principle of equality influences the retributive theory, as “whatever
undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself.
If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself.”13
Thus, by committing a crime an individual takes away his or her own ability to enjoy the
benefits of security. Equality represents part of the theory, but a court must decide the
quality and quantity of punishment, depending on the specific circumstances of a crime.
In addition to equality, Kant bases his theory on respect for persons, particularly treating
them as ends in themselves. Such respect is premised upon valuing one’s ability to make
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moral choices.14 Kant’s treatment of individuals as ends distinguishes his account from
utilitarian theories because individuals deserve punishment because of their actions rather
than any threat they may pose to society. The requirement of a court determining the
punishment serves to distinguish retribution from vengeance as sanctions stem from a
process involving laws, deliberation, and an impartial judiciary.
Under Kant’s theory, there is no substitute for punishment by the state, and this
becomes especially the case with regard to capital crimes and punishments. Kantian
justice therefore holds that “there is no similarity between life, however wretched it may
be, and death, hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death is
judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer.”15 Kant’s requirement for the death penalty
stems from a claim about proportionality as “there is no similarity between life and
death.” Proportionality, in this case, is very clear, since Kant argues that murder
demands the use of the death penalty. Determining the standard for other crimes may
prove to be more difficult, but Kant would argue that the principle of proportionality
should guide the state’s response to other crimes. Arthur Ripstein, in his book Equality,
Responsibility, and the Law, provides a concise justification for proportionality within
retributive punishment. He argues,
“punishment is scaled to the seriousness of the wrong rather than the expected
advantage of the crime because it treats the denial of the victim’s rights as the
measure of the wrongdoer’s gain. That loss is in the form of a loss of rights; the
wrongdoer’s putative gain is represented in terms of advantage because the
wrongdoer treated the victim’s rights in terms of advantage.”16
14
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Ripstein characterizes proportionality as reflecting the denial of the victim’s rights
resulting from the crime, adding an important clarification to Kant’s proportionality. He
establishes that the expressive component of retributive punishment is important in its
theoretical justification. By expressive, he means “making it clear that the criminal did
not succeed in treating victim’s rights as mere prices.”17
Two common criticisms of Kant’s retributive theory of punishment and of
retribution more generally focus on its detachment from the social good and its lack of a
justification for why criminals deserve such extreme harm of imprisonment or death. The
latter objections to imprisonment often contextualized in modern day since Kant did not
explicitly refer to imprisonment. The former objection referring to the social good can
draw on high rates of recidivism or more empirical negative consequences of modern
punishment. On a theoretical level, there is an intuition against maintaining a system of
retribution if it harms the majority of the population. The latter objection about why
individuals deserve such severe punishments represents a more interesting case. The
argument holds that retribution relies on the premise that individuals deserve punishment.
However, critics hold that the desert-based premise is insufficient to explain the amount
and type of punishment.
In “Morality and the Retributive Emotions,” J.L. Mackie articulates the main
objections to retribution, elaborating on the latter objection about desert. A central
question he discusses echoes the above criticism, as he asks “how are we to make moral
sense of a concept which includes this requirement, which envisages suffering or

17
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deprivation as being called for by a previous wrong action?”18 Mackie lays out several
common solutions to this conundrum of justifying suffering of a criminal to restore a past
wrongdoing and finds none of them adequate, and I will present the main arguments of
his discussion. He considers the idea that retributive punishment appeals to the
“satisfaction that may be felt by the surviving victims of a crime when the criminal
suffers,” but ultimately such satisfaction is utilitarian which is inconsistent with a pure
retributivism.19 Similarly, Mackie critiques the notion that punishment allows criminals
to restore debts to society because debt implies some good stemming from the
punishment. Hegel argues that punishment annuls the wrong of the crime, which Mackie
argues applies to Kant’s theory. But, the possibility of retroactively annulling the crime
is infeasible, which is why Mackie rejects this argument. Finally, Mackie debunks the
argument that punishment restores the balance by removing the unfair advantage the
criminal has gained from society by arguing that generally punishments are not determine
based on the advantage one garners but rather the extent of the moral wrongdoing.
Ultimately, retribution cannot be coherent theory without either relying on utilitarian
considerations or providing a justification for why a previous wrong merits suffering.
Therefore, Mackie turns to the biological tendency to resent certain antisocial behaviors,
which is translated sociologically into a moral system rejecting conduct that is considered
harmful to the community. The key part of Mackie’s conclusion is that retribution
necessarily involves human sentiment.
Mackie begins the discussion of the role of emotions within retribution, and
Walter Berns functions as an elaboration on Mackie. Berns, in his book, For Capital
18
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Punishment, articulates the connection between justice and anger, specifically for the
punishment of serious crimes. Berns’ argument relates to Mackie’s assessment of
retribution as he relies in part on emotion to justify the theory. Anger represents a desire
to hold individuals accountable for their actions, and “is accompanied not only by the
pain caused by him who is the object of anger, but by the pleasure arising from the
expectation of exacting revenge on someone who is thought to deserve it.”20 Punishment
serves as an outlet for the legitimate and natural expression of anger and pleasure by
upholding accountability within the moral community. Further, the death of a criminal
before punishment or abstaining from the practice, according to Berns, deprives us “of
something very valuable.”21 Such value refers to the connected expression of justice and
anger that are in turn required to uphold a moral community. The goal of upholding this
community may appear consequentialist in nature, but Berns critiques Beccaria and
Hobbes, who are traditionally thought of as consequentialist. The moral community
instead refers to a principled account of the responsibilities its members ought to adhere
to, similar to Kant’s rightful condition as a foundation for the criminal justice system and
punishment. The role of anger within the community “is an expression of that caring,
and society needs men who care for each other, who share their pleasures and pains, and
do so for the sake of others.”22
Berns’ connection between anger and justice seems Kantian in his emphasis on
responsibility. Responsibility, in the context of punishment, relates to “that respect
which is due to [the criminals] as men,” and “anger recognizes that only men have the

20
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capacity to be moral beings.”23 Thus, anger perpetuates and combines retributivist and
natural notions of accountability and personhood. In this sense, anger is a key link in
justifying retributivst theory and ultimately criminal punishment in practice. Anger
explains why harsh punishments are deserved in the context of serious and violent
crimes. These actions warrant the emotional reactions, which Mackie describes as
natural sentiments. The inherent moral nature and emotions involved in the punishment
process respond to the aforementioned criticism that there is a missing link between
desert and harsh punishments.
James Fitzjames Stephen, in A History of the Criminal Law of England, takes an
even harsher stance than Berns on retribution. He argues that severe criminals ought to
be hated, based on an idea of a moral community that resembles the one outlined by
Berns. According to Stephen, violent criminals “should be destroyed, partly in order to
gratify the indignation which such crimes produce” and “to make the world wholesomer
than it would otherwise be by ridding it of people as much misplaced in civilized society
as wolves or tigers would be in a populous country.”24 The indignation refers to the
anger felt by the victims, families, and broader citizenry. Such an extreme stance appears
justified in the case of the worst violent criminals since they have committed the worst
moral wrongdoings. In contrast with the more traditional retributivist approach, Stephen
particularly emphasizes the negative consequences imposed on the community, in a
seemingly more consequentialist manner. Further, Stephen argues that morality shapes
punishment in the legal system, since “if murder, theft, and rape were not punished by

23
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law, the words would still be in use, and would be applied to the same or nearly same
actions.”25 This observation points to the natural emotions and tendency towards anger
as a reaction to wrongdoing. Anger’s naturalness explains why it is a fundamental
justification for retribution and cannot be removed from the justice system.
Taken in conjunction, Mackie, Berns, and Stephen present important
contributions to the relationship between anger and retribution. One difficult dilemma
arises when anger seemingly overwhelms the proportionate punishment demanded by
retribution. This case would arise when people feel as though the punishment is
inadequate based on the victim, family, and community’s feelings after a particular
crime. The response from Berns and Stephen is premised upon the distinction between
legitimate retributive punishment and pure illegitimate vengeance, as particular laws and
judicial decisions, preventing anger from solely determining punishment, dictate
punishment. The role of anger will be discussed in the creation of laws, in the following
chapters on various policies.
Another dilemma arising from the role of anger is whether it is good for policy
and theory to be partially emotional rather than purely rational. The appropriate answer
to this question hinges on how the anger central to retributive punishment ultimately
bolsters the theoretical basis for retribution. Therefore, the question of good when
evaluating retributive theory should be based on the strength of the theoretical basis. The
good in terms of policy may refer more to the outcomes, but that requires a more
empirical assessment including the context of the particular policy. For example,
assessing the death penalty in California may include more empirical considerations such
25
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as budget, public opinion, and composition of the legislature, which are beyond the
theoretical focus of this chapter. Ultimately, crimes can be very personal, necessarily
involving emotions, so it seems reasonable for emotions to be involved. The question is
whether the emotions can be completely separate from the rationally-derived theories and
laws. Lawmakers often consider the actual individuals affected by laws, rather than
viewing everyone as abstract, purely rational agents. These effects and influence of
people in the lawmaking process will be explored in the subsequent policy chapters.
In The Laws of Plato, this question of the separation between the rational and
emotional elements is explored in the example of private retribution, which is permissible
in certain cases, thereby separating the personal issues of victims from the more practical
law. For example, “if someone should use violence for sexual purposes against a free
woman or boy, he may be killed with impunity by the violently outraged party, or the
father, or the brothers or sons.”26 Private vengeance is not limited by the laws, but up to
“the violently outraged party.” This permission implies that the laws have a gap in
rectifying damage to families. Conversely, Berns and Stephen use notion of the moral
community to at least partially remove the separation between public and private since
vengeance is only permissible within the law.
The role of the consequences follows from the emotional reaction to crimes.
There is a paradox within the theory of retributivism since the ends shape the severity of
the anger. For example, the brutal murder of many children will evoke more anger than
the attempted murder of one person. This example indicates how the consequences of
crime cannot be separated from the anger people experience as a result of crimes. It
26
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seems impossible to completely discount the consequences, yet retributivism seems to be
a purely deontological theory, focusing on means and principles rather than ends. This
dilemma can be resolved by arguing that the basis for punishment stems from the moral
worth of persons and inherent wrongs of crimes, but some consequentialist judgments
can influence how theory is translated into law. This approach of potentially using a
mixed theory, including elements from retributive and utilitarian thought, represents a
reasonable solution to the dilemma of pure theories.
Finally, I will return to the introduction of the discussion of the Socratic dilemma
involving punishment. If crimes are involuntary, then criminals are unable to exercise
their capacity for moral choice-making, making punishment unjust based on
retributivism’s own premise of respecting moral worth. From the standpoint of the
natural, moral community, crimes, despite their involuntariness, warrant anger. The
question becomes how to channel that anger if the crime is not deserved. Of course, in
the United States, there are exceptions for the mentally ill in the criminal justice system,
but the claim in Plato’s Apology applies to all crimes.

21

Chapter Two: Utilitarian Theory
Utilitarian theories are the traditional counterpart to retribution within the
discussion of criminal punishment. Utilitarian refers to deterrence and incapacitation. In
this chapter, I will examine Cesare Beccaria’s theory of deterrence in On Crimes and
Punishments since it is one of the first works on the topic, influencing later work and
laws. Jeremy Bentham has a similar theory, presented in The Principles of Morals and
Legislation, which I will compare to Beccaria’s. In relation to the previous chapter on
retribution, I will discuss contrasts between Kant and Beccaria, as well as a critical
observation about Beccaria’s work as a mixed theory rather than purely utilitarian.
Finally, I will discuss the role of incapacitation and its relation to other utilitarian
theories.
Beccaria begins his work with a justification for punishment. He argues that
individuals, motivated by the avoidance of the uncertainty of the state of war, sacrifice
minimal liberty for the good, which leads to the creation of laws.27 His emphasis on
minimal is important in establishing his concept of deterrence since it reinforces a limit
on state power. Punishment, therefore, is derived from “the necessity of defending the
depository of the public welfare against the usurpations of private individuals.”28
“Usurpations” imply that something is removed from the victim. Likely, the offender
harms the liberty, thereby negatively impacting the good. Beccaria’s concept of the good
seems based on liberty, but I will discuss his concepts of the good and justice
subsequently in more detail. Based on this justification for punishment, punishments
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should not exceed what is necessary to restrain criminals, underscoring the minimal
interference within this theory.29
Bentham justifies punishment in a similar manner to Beccaria. He maintains that
the goal of the laws is to increase happiness.30 Happiness therefore constitutes the good.
Bentham specifies that punishment is evil but necessary if it minimizes evil. Beccaria
holds a similar view but is not as explicit about punishment being evil. The explicitly
evil nature of punishment differs from the Kantian perspective. Under Kant’s view,
punishment, if inflicted by an official on a guilty offender, is just, independent of the
consequences. Such punishment has an inherent moral value.
After justifying punishment by the state, Beccaria outlines his theory of
proportionality. As a general principle guiding his proportionality, Beccaria writes, “one
may discern a scale of misdeeds wherein the highest degree consists of acts that are
directly destructive of society and the lowest of the least possible injustice against one of
its individual members.”31 The magnitude of the crime as it affects the nation is an
essential principle of Beccaria’s proportionality. He recognizes the necessary vagueness
of his scale, especially since ideas of morality, citizenship, and crime change over time.
Because of these changes, he seeks to establish a standard that is not contingent on his
time period. Further, he argues, “if geometry were adaptable to the infinite and obscure
arrangements of human activity, there ought to be a corresponding scale of punishments,
descending from the most rigorous to the slightest.”32 The infinity of human action

29
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explains Beccaria’s vagueness and difficulty developing a specific scale of
proportionality. He also notes that the state’s determination crimes should be purely
based on harm rather than sin. Sins refer to the relationship between man and God, and
the laws are only concerned with the relationships among humans. In this distinction,
Beccaria seeks to limit the power of the state, since biblical sin creates many more
categories of crimes. Similarly, Bentham captures his theory of proportionality in the
general principle, “the value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is
sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.”33
Beyond the general principles, Beccaria and Bentham both develop more specific
scales of proportionality. Beccaria lays out two categories of crimes in descending order
of severity. The first are crimes to the nation like high treason. Since these have the
greatest harm to the society, they merit the most punishment. Second, there are private
crimes such as individual physical violence. These crimes harm the nation as well but
not as destructively like crimes specifically targeted at the government.34 Bentham has
five classes of crimes, offenses against individuals, semi-public offenses against a
neighborhood or a class, harm to self, offenses against the state, and offenses relating to
falsehood and trust.35 He does not rank these crimes, but shares Beccaria’s principle of
regarding the crimes with the most harmful effects to the nation as the worst. Bentham
provides a more detailed account of the various subdivisions of crimes, but it functions
more as a list of possible crimes not a ranking of severity.
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Both deterrence theorists prescribe certain limits to punishment and necessary
conditions. The overarching limit is that punishment must increase utility; otherwise, it
ought to be altered. Beccaria emphasizes the importance of prompt punishment because
it maximizes the deterrent effect. He has a moral reason in favor of promptness, that
imprisoning people before they are proven guilty violates rights. Inevitability of
punishment, in addition to promptness, is more important than cruelty in terms of
deterrence. Beccaria opposes torture because it does not contribute to punishment’s
effectiveness, especially if it occurs secretly. He believes that the death penalty is
justified only in extreme cases in which an individual can severely damage the entire
nation such as through revolution. The public laws are important to maintaining
deterrence. Beccaria stresses the importance of the printing press to make the general
public aware of the laws. The laws should also be easily understood.36 Bentham agrees
with the clarity and accessibility of the laws and adds a restriction on ex post facto laws.37
These restrictions preempt the common objections to utilitarian punishment, that an
innocent person can be punished if doing so maximizes the good. Beccaria and Bentham
both want to avoid that scenario, though it is unclear if their restrictions are motivated in
part by a rights-based justice.
The limits that Beccaria establishes are important to examine in contrast with
common objections. Anthony Duff, in his book, Punishment, Communication, and
Community, explores the rights issue as a criticism of deterrence’s utilitarian foundation.
He presents the objection that deterrence theory allows for punishment of the innocent
individual, if doing so will promote the greater good. Since rights are secondary to
36
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utility, meaning they are not “'trumps' that should protect individuals from being
sacrificed to social utility (see R. Dworkin 1978, ch. 4).”38 Even if Beccaria includes
these rights-based limits, they are conditional depending on if they promote utility. For
example, if the public does not know about someone’s innocence, punishing that innocent
individual would not decrease the people’s sense of trust and legitimacy. Punishing the
innocent, in that case, would be permissible. Utilitarians respond by arguing that this
example would never happen in practice. However, the theoretical possibility of such an
example highlights the theory’s disconnect from justice, pointing to a weakness.
Beccaria’s notion of justice is important to examine because it is the underlying
principle behind much of his theory. Justice is “the aggregate of these smallest possible
portions of individual liberty” which “constitutes the right to punishment.”39
Presumably, justice does not exist outside of a legal context if there is no state holding
the right to punish. Beccaria clarifies that justice is merely “the bond necessary to hold
private interests together,” which also depends on the existence of a state.40 If justice
depends on the context of a state, it cannot exist in a natural setting. Impulses towards
justice are not natural but rather produced by the state’s impact on its constituents. In this
regard, Beccaria drastically differs from Kant, particularly Berns’ interpretation. Berns’
argument rests on the premise that anger, a natural sentiment, reflects individuals’
impulse towards justice. Beccaria would hold that the anger is either a product of
artificial justice produced by the state, or a natural human impulse that is not reflective of
justice but merely emotion.
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Justice establishes the right to punish and the restrictions on individual conduct.
It is not a vision for society to attain. Ultimately, the system of punishment is aimed at
the good. The good, according to Beccaria, is minimizing harms to the nation and
individuals. He argues that crimes constituting harm to society represents “one of those
palpable truths which one needs neither quadrants nor telescopes to discover and which
are within the reach of every ordinary intellect.”41 Beccaria implies that people can
intuitively reject harm and want to join a state, which achieves that goal. This intuition
mirrors Berns’ discussion of instincts towards anger and pleasure, but is not categorized
as moral. The good is more of a practical security goal than a moral one. Beccaria
discusses the good in the context of the political dogma that each citizen should be able
“to do anything that is not against the law without fearing any ill consequences.”42 The
political dogma refers to freedom, which could be interpreted as an intrinsic moral value.
Instead, Beccaria recognizes that individuals want as much liberty as possible so the law
should account for that fact. Again, it functions as more of a practical consideration.
Beccaria’s artificial concepts of the good and justice occasionally contain some
retributive undertones. David Young, in his article, “Cesare Beccaria: Utilitarian or
retributivist” argues that Beccaria’s theory in some respects is mixed rather than purely
utilitarian. Young focuses on Beccaria’s right to punish, question of rights, and
consideration of social context. In establishing the right to punish, Beccaria relies on a
hypothetical social and political contract in which individuals give up liberty for
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protection. Young believes that this contract is retributive rather than utilitarian.43 While
the contractual model may have some retributive elements, the ultimate goal is still
utilitarian. In this sense, it is mixed, but one theoretical influence holds more weight.
The question of rights is more controversial. Young notes that Beccaria
establishes certain limits to punishment, particularly related to the death penalty.
Beccaria believes that the death penalty is annihilation rather than legitimate coercion and
that the finality of death takes away the right to challenge the penalty. Young argues that
his rejection of the death penalty and excessive punishment is based on valuing human
virtue.44 If the virtue account is correct, this consideration of individual rights reflects
retributive theory. Kant based his theory on respect for human dignity, which sounds like
Young’s characterization of Beccaria. However, Kant uses the notion of human dignity
to justify the death penalty, while Beccaria potentially uses it as a limitation on that form
of punishment. Beccaria makes an observation about dignity which is useful in this
discussion. He advocates for a separation of the dignity of the injured party from the
public good, since the good is a more practical, security-based construct.45 This
separation opposes Kant because Kant views that the good consists of respecting both the
dignity of the injured party and the offender. Punishment serves as the proper balance
between the two. Perhaps dignity is still relevant in considering limitations on
punishment under Beccaria’s theory. There seems to be an inconsistency in Beccaria’s
work if Young is correct. When characterizing justice, Beccaria is very explicit in
articulating its artificial nature. Dignity and virtue generally refer to inherent moral
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ideas, but it is possible that Beccaria used them to refer to artificial constructs. In this
sense, Beccaria is slightly retributive, but only if using such language maximizes utility.
Finally, Young argues that Beccaria considers the social context of punishment
through his support for equality before the law and “for a society of equals in which
rights and obligations would be equitably distributed and the law could indeed be
regarded as the will of each and every citizen.”46 The rhetoric of rights and obligations
could appear retributive, but they are ultimately aimed at a utilitarian end. Beccaria’s
intentional vagueness when establishing the proportional punishments allows for
individual societies to tailor laws to the particular social situations, as long as doing so is
utilitarian. Kant would allow for societal differences and equality before the law, but his
theory points to a more inherent system of values, which seems less malleable.
The significance of a mixed theory of punishment is important theoretically and
practically. One objection to Kant’s theory concerns why such harsh coercion is used
once the damage of a crime has already occurred. Beccaria answers this objection easily
by articulating the benefit of deterrence to the public good. The mixed justification,
combining some Kantian and Beccarian elements, can also have appeal within a
pluralistic society of different interests in which some citizens or lawmakers prefer
retribution and others prefer deterrence. Arthur Ripstein offers a mixed theory of
punishment, combining retributive and deterrence-based reasoning. He recognizes that
retribution provides the necessary condition that punishment only be inflicted upon
individuals who have committed a wrongdoing. Under retribution, this punishment of the
guilty does not change based on the effects of implementing it. However, Ripstein
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recognizes that the deterrence model ensures the effectiveness of punishment and
explains its harshness.
Incapacitation is an important variant within the utilitarian school of thought.
Incapacitation represents the modern version of utilitarian theory, especially in the United
States’ reliance on incarceration. William Paley first supported this theory in the late 18th
century.47 Prior to incapacitation, punishments in the Western world consisted of
physical responses such as branding or public execution. The idea holds that locking
away the worst criminals achieves utility since they cannot commit crimes while
incarcerated (besides crimes committed in prison). Incapacitation differs from Beccarian
deterrence since it focuses on preventing future crimes by convicted criminals. Beccaria
aims to influence all citizens and dissuade them from committing crimes. He specifies
this goal in his argument the about value of public awareness about punishments for
lesser crimes rather than the most severe crimes. This awareness will prevent the average
citizen from committing crimes they might otherwise consider. Incapacitation and
deterrence seem contradictory because incapacitation holds that no one can be deterred.
They could be compatible only if the law is premised on deterrence for most offenders
and incapacitation for a subset of offenders who cannot be deterred, such as certain serial
murderers.
The initial objection about involuntariness of crime in Plato’s Apology is relevant
to utilitarian theory. Deterrence operates on the assumption that the state’s laws can
influence individual choice to commit crime. If crimes are involuntary, this would not
work. Involuntariness is compatible with incapacitation, however. This difference
47
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highlights the philosophical incompatibility of deterrence and incapacitation since they
hold different assumptions about Socrates’ statement relates to the previous discussion of
justice. The involuntary nature of the crime seems insignificant from a pure utilitarian
theory, as long as punishing crime minimizes harm. If there is some concern about
justice, such as that unjust punishment decreases utility or is inherently wrong,
involuntary crimes could be inconsistent with Beccaria’s theory. Extreme instances of
compulsory wrongdoing would likely be regarded as not meriting punishment such as the
case of the mentally ill or young child. If all crimes were involuntary, Beccaria’s theory
would not be logically sound because it relies so heavily on individual choice.
In addition to the question of involuntariness, The Laws of Plato provides another
criticism of utilitarian theories of law. The Athenian Stranger believes that the ideal legal
system would apply to virtuous individuals, but that is only possible hypothetically.
Instead, “it’s necessary to have legislation that anticipates and threatens such a man,” but
such laws are “in a certain way shameful.”48 Such a man refers to the non-virtuous
individuals that the law must target. Because of the distinction between the virtuous and
common people, there is a disconnect between the law and virtue, since the law aims to
influence the lowest forms of human behavior.
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Chapter Three: Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation as a theory of punishment entails different ideas and theories from
the traditional accounts of retribution and deterrence. Some would not even characterize
it as theory of punishment at all but rather as an alternative to it. Duff distinguishes
rehabilitation from consequentialist punishment because the former explicitly embraces
the goal of reforming the perpetrator. He classifies rehabilitation as improving people’s
skills, capacities, and opportunities with the same goal as the consequentialist reform
account.49 The main difference lies in the methods of achieving a change in behavior,
which is generally treatment instead of punishment. Karl Menninger relies on this
distinction between treatment and punishment in The Crime of Punishment. His theory
and defense of treatment is essential in establishing a theory of rehabilitation.
Menninger, unlike Kant and Beccaria, combines theory and practice in establishing his
argument for treatment. He relies on more empirical assessments of psychiatry and
current penal practice. Those elements are less relevant for this chapter since it aims to
evaluate the theoretical foundation of rehabilitation. Menninger’s empirical leanings are
emblematic of the absence of purely theoretical justifications of rehabilitation. Jean
Hampton, in “The Moral Education of Punishment” presents a quasi-rehabilitative theory.
She argues that “by reflecting on the educative character of punishment we can provide a
full and complete justification for it.”50 Her analysis is relevant to alternatives to
traditional notions of retribution and deterrence. In this chapter, I will present
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Menninger’s theory, Hampton’s theory, a discussion of justice within rehabilitation, and
C.S. Lewis’s critique of treatment.
Menninger opens his book by stating that punishment is a crime against all
criminals, critiquing the traditional distinction between victims and criminals. The state
and its proponents are the criminal. More specifically, “the worst crime is our ignorance
about crime; our easy satisfaction with headlines and the accounts of lurid cases; and our
smug assumption that it is all a matter of some tough ‘bad guys’ whom the tough ‘good
guys’ will soon capture.”51 Again, Menninger challenges the notions of bad vs. good and
criminal vs. victim, as the line is blurrier than traditionally understood. He references
empirical assessments through the headlines, but these beliefs can also be applied to
individuals’ general moral sense. By ignorance, he refers to this simplicity and also the
lack of understanding and study of the social danger, social error, and social indifference
that leads to crime.
Menninger starts from the premise that punishment is a crime against criminals
because of its injustice and ineffectiveness. He believes punishment is a crime in part
because it misunderstands what crime is. Instead of the common interpretation of crime
as a legal or moral wrongdoing, Menninger believes crime “should be treated” as if it
were a disease, but it is not dealt with in this way.52 The treatment account holds that
individuals can be changed and helped. It also implies a lack of blame, as we typically
do not fault individuals for acquiring a disease. Perhaps they could have taken some
precautions, but bad luck is often involved. Menninger believes that crime should be
viewed as a disease because it is mostly curable and that the bad character traits can be
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altered through the correct treatment. He argues that many offenders are not “‘fully
aware’ of what they are doing,” which complicates the notion of guilt.53 The justification
for treatment stems in part from its effectiveness in improving offenders and the lack of
responsibility for crimes.
Menninger uses a striking observation about humans’ capacity to commit crimes
in his account. He boldly asserts that “crime is everybody’s temptation”, but we usually
do not get caught.54 People dodge this indictment, according to Menninger, by claiming
that “even if it be true that many of us are guilty of committing these petty crimes, they
are at least ‘semi-respectable crimes.’”55 The examples Menninger gives include stealing
from hotels, embezzlement, and filing dishonest insurance claims. He states that there is
a false dichotomy between “semi-respectable” crimes and people who are “villains” and
“killers.”56 In this argument, Menninger portrays human nature negatively, as everyone
has the capacity for wrongdoing. The former justification of crime as a disease implies
that a select group possesses some involuntary harmful trait. If everyone has these traits,
it seems like all people should receive treatment.
Menninger anticipates the question of what a world where treatment replaced
punishment would look like. He proposes that each criminal would receive tailored
treatment for his or her problematic traits in a medical, scientific environment rather than
in a conventional prison, but while maintaining the security of prison.57 He objects to
punishment, which he classifies as “the deliberate infliction of pain in addition to or in
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lieu of penalty.”58 Menninger implies that treatment requires effectiveness, which he
claims modern punishment lacks. The evolution of modern punishment as incarceration
for long periods of time to be “more cruel and destructive than beating” also motivates
the shift to treatment as an alternative to punishment.59 Menninger clarifies that his
advocacy of treatment stems from the medical principle to relieve pain, which he
contrasts with the status quo in which inmates unjustly endure pain for no purpose.60 He
insists that his bases are not sentimental but entirely rational, unlike the proponents of
punishment, especially on retributive grounds.
Hampton’s theory shares Menninger’s questioning of modern punishment, but has
some key differences, namely that her account is not entirely at odds with retributivism.
The ultimate goal of moral education theory is to teach ethical knowledge to criminals.61
This goal is more of an intrinsic good to better the criminal rather than a goal to decrease
the harm from punishment.62 Punishment provides “moral reasons for our choosing not
to perform these actions.”63 She values the premise of treating individuals as ends and
therefore not sacrificing them for the public good. However, punishment is only moral if
done under certain constraints, which represents the major difference between Hampton
and Menninger. Hampton does not support treatment since she views most criminals as
having autonomy to understand and learn moral concepts.64
Because Hampton’s theory depends on ethical knowledge within punishment, she
presupposes the existence of a system of ethics. However, she never specifies the details
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of this ethical system, and implies that it can be relative to the individual societies. She
intentionally leaves gaps in terms of the implementation and content of the ethics. Yet
there is one principle she would apply everywhere: the value of individual worth and the
prohibition on using someone for a greater end. In this sense, her notion of morality
mirrors Kant’s, but requires more elaboration to be a complete theory.
Unlike Hampton, Menninger critiques most established notions of justice,
potentially denying its existence or legitimacy. He describes justice as “a subjective
emotional word” when referencing Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ argument that
litigants manipulate justice to be in their favor.65 The “emotional” component mirrors
Chapter One’s discussion of anger’s role in retribution. In contrast with Berns and
Stephen, Menninger opposes the presence of emotion in justice and desires a more
rational approach. Both camps, however, accept that emotions play some role, though
they dispute the merits. An important question arises within Menninger’s mention of
Holmes about the theoretical and practical uses and interpretations of justice. Holmes is
clearly making an observation about attorneys’ arguments and rhetoric within the
courtroom. This statement differs from the theoretical accounts of punishment and
justice particularly those offered by Kant. Kant would likely agree that ethical concepts
can be manipulated, those manipulations do not reflect an accurate representation of
justice or morality. Menninger, by frequently citing empirical cases, implies that he
believes practical and theoretical concepts of justice are blurred. His definition,
therefore, is complicated or potentially nonexistent.
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The argument that punishment in the name of justice actually leads to injustice is
central to Menninger’s advocacy for treatment. This statement assumes that there is
some definition of justice in order to identify what counts as injustice in the first place.
Justice cannot be nonexistent, despite Menninger’s implication that it is a sham.
Otherwise, his argument for treatment would be incomprehensible since we would not be
able to understand why it the comparatively just option. Menninger focuses more on
defining what justice is commonly viewed as, and how his ideal differs, especially in the
context of pain and retribution. He defines it as “something terrible which somebody
‘sees to it’ that somebody else gets, not something good, helpful, or valuable, but
something that hurts.”66 The ideas of hurt and good depend on a normative conception of
right and wrong, but again, these are unclear in Menninger’s account and seem to appeal
to the common retributivist understanding. Specifically, when Menninger discusses how
criminals are not fully responsible for their actions, rendering punishment unjust, he
bases that claim on some notion of desert. In referring to the damages done by
punishment, he makes a utilitarian claim, such as “that all the crimes committed by all the
jailed criminals do not equal in total social damage that of the crimes committed against
them.”67 This estimate relates to Beccaria and Bentham’s mandate that punishment must
promote the greater good rather than cause more harm. Menninger does not critique
utility as explicitly as he does retribution. Perhaps his notions of justice and the good
stem from utility, but there is still this pervasive idea that individuals deserve treatment
rather than punishment. His appeals to justice are striking given that he introduces his
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argument by emphasizing the injustice of modern punishment and that crime is a disease
for which individuals should not be blamed.
In Chapter 8, Menninger discusses vengeance as a motivation behind punishment
and how it has evolved over time. Previously, he believes vengeance was more overt,
especially with public crimes. He also partially conflates vengeance and revenge when
he states, “behind what we do to the offender is the desire for revenge on someone – the
unknown villain proved guilty of wrongdoing is a good scapegoat. We call it a wish to
see justice done, i.e., to have him ‘punished.’”68 Scapegoat implies a wrongful use of
punishment, since the individual would represent some other problem besides the crime
committed. This example constitutes a negative portrayal of Berns and Stephen,
suggesting that their accounts lead to overly harsh revenge. The naturalness of the
emotions within justice, as highlighted by Berns and Mackie, provides an interesting
tension for Menninger’s theory. If justice represents a natural sentiment, it may be
impossible to eliminate it within the criminal justice system. Since sentencing,
lawmaking, and judging will always be human responsibilities, that natural instinct will
likely be involved. Even if the system was premised upon Menninger’s plan for
treatment, the determination of treatment may not be able to be divorced from justice.
William Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice first published in 1793
opposes traditional punishment and provides a similar critique of retributivism based on
vengeance. He claims that there is no such thing as desert, which is motivated both by
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his belief in the wrongness of coercion and of social conditions contributing to crime.69
Coercion, in this case, is wrong because it is applied retroactively. In addition to the
critique of desert, Godwin opposes punishment that does not promote the good, so
coercion must prevent future crimes. If the crime has already been committed, it clearly
cannot be prevented by punishment. Godwin focuses largely on how coercion in the case
of punishment is divorced from reason and instead based on anger and resentment. The
emotions driving punishment make the penalties unnecessarily harsh. Like Menninger,
Godwin shifts between the philosophical and empirical. Much of his criticism is directed
at the British system of the 18th century, though he often does so on theoretical grounds.
Godwin’s observation about the danger of vengeance going too far is an important
critique of retribution. Retribution is clearly subject to abuses, which will be important in
the policy chapters applying these theories.
On the interaction between justice and treatment, C.S. Lewis offers a well-known
critique of theory’s like Menninger’s in “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment,”
though he wrote this essay well before Menninger’s book appeared. He contends that
therapeutic approaches or rehabilitation denies individuals the right of being treated as
morally responsible beings. Treatment’s denial of rights stems from its removal of
desert, which Lewis maintains “is the only connecting link between punishment and
justice.”70 Since desert is the only factor tying punishment to justice, other aims such as
reform or deterrence are separate from justice. Again, the notion of personhood appears
in Lewis’ opposition to non-retributive theories which view criminals as “a mere object, a
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patient, a ‘case’” rather than “a person, a subject of rights.”71 Viewing individuals as
patients subjects their treatment to the decisions of scientific experts who are divorced
from justice, preventing criticism of these experts’ judgments. Sentencing becomes
indefinite because it depends on the effectiveness of treatment, which is arbitrary in terms
of justice. For example, a petty thief may require ten years to heal, while a murderer may
only need three, which Lewis regards as unjust. Since treatment, according to Lewis,
depends on effectiveness, these varying treatment sentences are a necessary component
of a rehabilitative theory.
Fundamental questions about the nature of punishment have arisen from these
theorists’ responses and modifications of rehabilitation. The issue of responsibility and
involuntariness is a key component of Menninger’s argument for treatment and its
divergence from Lewis. If crimes are involuntary, the entire understanding of the ideas
of crime, wrongdoing, and punishment change. Ultimately, the definition of justice is
important in determining what crimes and punishments are. Menninger’s appeal to
justice throughout his argument contains implicit references to desert, namely that
punishment is unjust to criminals. These references indicate that he was unable to
separate his theory from an understanding of justice that in part stems from retributivism.
Rehabilitation seems to require individuals to view crime as a problem to be dealt with
using science. The instincts and emotions expressing justice would prevent such a
scientific understanding. However, if such expression is not natural, but rather learned
from the retributive laws, change may be possible.
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The Laws of Plato tackles these fundamental questions regarding criminal law.
The Athenian Stranger starts from the premise that the law targets humans rather than
gods, implying that it will not be the ideal or virtuous system. The practical goal of
“legislation that anticipates and threatens such a man” is necessary yet “in a certain way
shameful.”72 Despite advocating for a system of laws based in part on deterrence, the
Athenian concedes that crime is involuntary. Crime occurs because of “a certain gadfly
that grows naturally in human beings as a result of ancient and unexpiated injustices,”
which is emphasized in the prelude to Book IX.73 Therefore, some natural impulse based
on past injustices causes certain individuals to commit crimes. Following this concession
about the nature of crime, the Athenian notes, “for him who obeys, the law should be left
silent; but for him who disobeys, it sings in a loud voice, after the prelude.”74 Then the
Athenian describes the physical punishment required for temple robberies, which should
be instituted regardless of the crime’s voluntariness. The Athenian later distinguishes
involuntary and voluntary crimes and their requisite punishments, though he initially
maintains that all crime is involuntary. This distinction highlights the compromise
between the ideal and practical forms of law. Such compromise is necessary, as Lorraine
Smith Pangle writes, “no society is able to deter unhealthy souls from crime without
imposing harsh punishments on its most unhealthy citizens, punishments that usually
make their souls even worse.”75
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However, the Athenian maintains that crime should make “the one who receives
the judicial punishment either better or less wicked,” implying that punishment aims at
some reformative goal.76 At the same time, there is no treatment or education, like what
Menninger proposes, but rather violent, physical punishment, exile, or death for the worst
cases. It is unclear how such punishment guarantees an improvement in character,
especially in the instances of exile or death. Later in Book IX, the Athenian refers to
punishment’s goal of purifying individuals, which seems to differ from the traditional
violence of punishment.
Further, the Athenian distinguishes educating and legislating, though shifting
between which ought to be the purpose of criminal law. He uses the example of two
doctors to explain this distinction. One doctor “practices medicine on the basis of
experiences rather than reason” and treats patients without explaining their diseases.77
The second doctor is the “free doctor” who explains the reasons for diseases in addition
to providing treatment, “using arguments that come close to philosophizing, grasping the
disease from its source, and going back up to the whole nature of bodies.”78 The first
doctor would laugh at the second doctor and say, “‘you’re not doctoring the sick man,
you’re practically educating him, as if what he needed were to become a doctor, rather
than healthy!’”79 In this example, the Athenian implies that traditional ideas of
punishment and treatment differ from true reform, in which the criminal understands the
wrongness of the crime. This observation is crucial in this chapter, since it could also
apply to Menninger’s mode of treatment, since it does not sufficiently address moral
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understanding. It clearly critiques retribution and deterrence, as those theories do not
focus on moral education and understanding.

43

Chapter Four: Determinate Sentencing
California’s legal shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing during the
late 1970’s represents a rejection of rehabilitation and endorsement of punishment.
Indeterminate sentencing “was part of the process of making criminal justice better suited
to the individual case.”80 It was combined with parole and judicial discretion in
sentencing and release, as opposed to strict sentencing guidelines for particular crimes.
One definition of indeterminate sentencing holds that “it is a continuum of devices
designed to tailor punishment, particularly the duration of confinement, to the
rehabilitative needs and special dangers of the particular criminal” and that the length is
determined while the individual is serving the sentence.81 The case of determinate
sentencing is relevant in applying the theories to practical policy cases because it
involves a conflict of rehabilitation, retribution, and utilitarian goals, in conjunction with
other implementation issues. California is an important example because it was one of
the first states to make the change, setting the stage for other states to do the same. In
this chapter, I will explain the background of the shift and provide an analysis of
California’s law in terms of the theories outlined in the previous chapters.
California adopted an indeterminate sentencing law in 1917 and switched to a
determinate sentencing law, the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976.82 During
the 1950’s and 1960’s, “a wave of conservatism swept the country,” in part motivated by
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fear and hatred of crime.83 The intensified fear stemmed from the increased crime rate,
and the public pressured politicians to take action. During the increased crime rate, “the
American system tends to shift its emphasis from the offender to the offense.”84 Critics
alleged that indeterminate sentencing focused on the offender’s well-being rather than
public safety or proportionality.
An important contributor among the causes of the enactment of determinate
sentencing was internal issues within the California correctional bureaucracy.
Specifically, the Director of Corrections held responsibility for prisons and the parole
organizations, while the Adult Authority separately had discretion over parole and
discharge decisions.85 Police and prosecutors, as key players within the Director of
Corrections’ office, opposed the Authority’s exercise of discretion. The two parts of the
Department of Corrections, the Director of Corrections and the Adult Authority, were in
conflict with one another, preventing effective policy-making. The Director of
Corrections found the Adult Authority’s “practice of fixing terms late a block to rational
planning, its terms unpredictable, its release and parole revocation actions subject to
whim and political influence.”86 The inability to find effective compromise motivated
the need for new legislation to define these irreconcilable conflicts.
Indeterminate sentencing received criticism from the right and left for varying
reasons. The left criticized the arbitrary sentence lengths and discrimination against
minorities by judges and parole boards, while the right distrusted judges to enforce
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sufficiently harsh sentences, harming public safety.87 For example, The American
Friends Service Committee emphasized “the failure of individualized treatment and… the
use of the medical model to increase coercion and punishment, and called for laws that
would fit punishment to the crime rather than to assumed treatment potential.”88 Another
prevalent criticism was the disregard for victims in the indeterminate laws’ overemphasis
on the offender’s rights, which was compounded by the increase in crime.89 The
California shift to determinate sentencing is regarded as a compromise “aided by a
tendency for the objectives of seemingly opposing interests…to overlap at certain points
and by conflict within supposedly unified groups.”90 In 1972, the US Supreme Court
ruled on a California case, In re Lynch, involving a man, John Lynch, who had been in
prison for five years on a charge of indecent exposure after consistently being denied
parole.91 The justices found “that the punishment not only failed to fit the crime, but
failed to ‘fit the criminal.’”92 This case elucidated that rehabilitation did not meet its own
purpose of “fitting the criminal” and was disproportionate, violating concerns of justice.
Another relevant case in the constitutional challenge of indeterminate sentencing
was In re Stanley of 1976, which was argued before the Court of Appeals of California in
the Second Appellate District. In this case, two individuals challenged the Adult
Authority’s right “to postpone their parole dates on the basis of concurrent sentences
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imposed for lesser offenses.”93 They argued that the decision of release entirely based on
the nature of the offense and prior criminal history ignored other important variables such
as conduct in prison and post-release safety. The Court found that these other variables
should be part of the individualized treatment under the existing indeterminate
sentencing.94 This case demonstrates a flaw in judicial discretion under indeterminate
sentencing that existing laws were inadequate in incorporating all of the essential
variables in judging an individual’s parole case. The indeterminate sentencing law was
unable to fulfill its own intended purpose. In re Stanley motivated the need for new
standards, even among supporters of indeterminate sentencing, in turn driving the
Governor and other groups to support the new Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act.
The Attorney General’s Office’s statement in support of the bill was also
important in propelling its passage. Attorney General Jack Winkler issued a supportive
paper in 1975. He argued that indeterminate sentencing did not control recidivism. His
statement focused on the principled aim of punishments which should be upholding
“societal values” among other goals, though he questioned deterrence and isolation as
appropriate goals. To achieve the aim of upholding societal values, Winkler urged the
adoption of a sentencing scheme to account for mitigating and aggravating factors,
criminal history, and behavior in prison. Johnson and Messinger note that Winkler’s
principles mirror those important in guiding the provisions in Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act. If their analysis is correct, the Attorney General’s statement emphasizes
the retributive justice important in the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing.
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Winkler prioritizes upholding values, similar to Berns’ moral community, rather than
deterrence as the goal of punishment.
The specific movement for determinate sentencing legislation was initiated by
California Senator John A. Nejedly, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Penal
Institutions in 1974.95 He began an investigation into California juvenile justice and
indeterminate sentencing more broadly, involving consultants, legislative staff, law
professors, lobbyists, and judges in research on the laws and policies.96 Nejedly’s team
produced a working paper “suggesting cut-down ranges of penalties for offenses and
giving judges discretion to fix a maximum prison term within those ranges” while still
permitting the Adult Authority to decide a prisoner’s parole.97 This working paper
spurred open hearings in late 1974. In the hearings, most witnesses supported increased
determinacy with fixed sentences from the legislature, while judges opposed the shift.98
The working papers were modified, resulting in the introduction of SB 42 to the Senate in
March 1975 and passed in May 1975.99 A later version of SB 42 passed in May 1976
incorporating amendments supported by the Governor and law enforcement groups.100
Determinate sentencing arose in many states during the 1970’s. All alternative
proposals emphasized the need for fixed prison terms and rejected rehabilitation but
“varied greatly on such provisions as parole, good time, commitment criteria, and the
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overall severity of punishment.”101 Thus, the shift did not abolish all elements of
indeterminate sentencing, as there was still judicial discretion but combined with stricter
standards and sentencing limits. Determinate sentencing in California sets the “length of
the prison term appropriate for each felony is prescribed by law; within limits, the courts
may add to or subtract from this term to fit the individual case.”102
The Judicial Council Report on the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act begins
with discussing the causes for the new law. The two main reasons are the uncertainty of
actual prison terms under indeterminate sentencing and a rejection of the idea that
optimum rehabilitation identified with a particular release date could be determined.103
The first concern about uncertainty of actual prison terms could be motivated by both
utilitarian and justice-based concerns. If serious offenders spend insufficient time in
prison, they can be released and pose a danger to society. The justice issue is that prison
terms could be too lengthy, short, or arbitrary, failing to give prisoners what they deserve.
This objection relates to C.S. Lewis’s overarching criticism of treatment over punishment
because he similarly argues that rehabilitative sentences “can be criticized only by
fellow-experts and on technical grounds, never by men as men and on grounds of
justice.”104 Lewis’s objection differs from the judicial report’s preface because it is
purely on the basis of justice, rather than the report’s list of causes ranging from arbitrary
sentences to crime rates. The law combines concerns about justice and utilitarian issues.
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It is unclear which was prioritized in motivating this legal change. If indeterminate
sentencing had been effective in reducing crime, critics may have overlooked the
arbitrary sentencing problem. This prediction is bolstered by Friedman’s above analysis
about how crime rates, a utilitarian concern, motivate the public’s pressure on politicians
to enact more offense-focused legislation. On the other hand, the public’s sentiment
could be driven by Berns or Stephen’s arguments that injustice incites anger, prompting
individuals to seek justice for the increasing violent crimes. In this case, seeking justice
would mean supporting determinate sentencing to lead to harsher sentences.
The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law applied to felonies other than those
resulting in life or death sentences.105 It provided three possible sentences for judges to
impose for each crime, a mitigated, base, and aggravated sentence.106 For example, if a
homicide also involved torture, the judge could select the aggravated sentence. These
three options provided a more defined alternative to indeterminate sentencing, which
gave judges more leeway. The law also promoted uniformity in the areas of imposing
probation, the aggravated or mitigated sentence, concurrent or consecutive sentences,
additional sentences for previously convicted offenders, and “an additional sentence for
being armed with a deadly weapon, using a firearm, an excessive taking or damage or the
infliction of great bodily injury.”107 These provisions for uniformity implicitly value
proportionality, especially those regarding mitigated or aggravated sentences and
particularly violent conduct.
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The Judicial Council Report highlights the main features of the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Law with a section on the law’s uniformity of sentencing. Their
analysis emphasizes that “the first sentence is, ‘The Legislature find and declares that the
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.’”108 Punishment as the purpose
implies that the legislature’s intent was retributive in nature, though punishment as a
stated goal can be vague. If they had intended a purely utilitarian purpose like a Beccaria
or Bentham, the authors likely would have inserted the words reducing crime or public
safety as the immediate purpose. The Attorney General statement adds evidence to the
interpretation of punishment as retributive because he supported punishment to uphold a
moral community, and the principles in his statement mirror the law. Second, to further
the retributive goals of the law, the Council highlights the requirement that sentences be
proportional to the seriousness of the crime.109 Third, the report notes that the
determinate sentences are to be fixed by statute, only allowing variance within the
permissible range of the law.110 Fourth and similarly, the report underscores the law’s
goal to have general uniformity of the grant or denial of probation.111 Fifth, the rules do
not address a specific way for judges to determine alternatives to imprisonment like
probation. Judicial discretion to grant probation was not altered by the new determinate
sentencing law.112 Likely, these offenses were less important since they are not as
morally egregious or dangerous to the public.
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The report focuses on Rule 410 of the law on the General Objectives in
Sentencing. This provision provides a list of objectives judges should consider during
sentencing. The list is
“a) protecting society, b) punishing the defendant, c) encouraging the
defendant to lead a law abiding life in the future and deterring him from future
offenses, d) deterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its
consequences, e) preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by
isolating him, f) securing restitution for victims of crime, g) achieving
uniformity in sentencing.113”
At first glance, it seems as though these objectives could be in the form of an
ordered list of priorities of punishment. However, “the sentencing judge should
determine which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case.”114 The list
differs from the law’s first sentence and Winkler’s statement since it does not purport that
“b) punishing the defendant” is the primary goal in sentencing. Perhaps this list was a
compromise to incorporate the different aims of punishment and judges’ desire for
discretion. Some of the goals are consistent with one another; the only issue would be
when they explicitly conflict. Punishing the defendant and achieving uniformity in
sentencing seem related to justice since they do not reference the public or some
utilitarian goal of safety. The other goals, protecting society, isolation, specific and
general deterrence, reference utilitarian concerns. This list therefore represents a key
example of the mixed sentencing discussed in the first two chapters. In the Chapter Two,
Beccaria’s references to individual rights throughout his theory are striking given his
utilitarian approach. The Beccarian example and Rule 410 bring up the question of if
rights-based concerns are integrated into utilitarian provision to benefit the greater good.
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For example, uniformity in sentencing can also benefit deterrence because the citizens are
aware of the punishments associated with particular crimes.
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Chapter Five: California Three Strikes Law
California’s 1994 “Three Strikes and You’re Out” legislation is an important case
study for both policy and philosophical reasons. The legislation enhances penalties for
felons convicted of second and third term offenses. From a policy perspective, California
was one of the first states to adopt this legislation, influencing other states. Given the
state’s large prison population and comparative drastic change in sentencing from Three
Strikes, the impacts of law were substantial and unique to California.115 Further, the
adoption of the law occurred through both the legislature and the initiative process,
contributing a distinctive element of populism to the discussion of this version of Three
Strikes.
The strong influence of populism in California’s enactment of Three Strikes
explains in part why this case is noteworthy on a philosophical level. The California
citizens’ advocacy for Three Strikes provides insights into their stances on the various
philosophies and purposes of punishment. The law itself seems to advance incapacitation
as the goal of punishment, combined with elements of deterrence and retribution and a
general rejection of rehabilitation. In this chapter, I will present the background of the
causes leading to Three Strikes in California including some political factors and the
provisions of the law. I will then discuss the philosophical implications and how Three
Strikes fits into the broader discussion of theory. Finally, I will present the more recent
modifications to Three Strikes.
Two tragic murder cases arose in California and motivated the enactment of Three
Strikes. In October 1993, 12 year-old Polly Klaas was abducted from her Petaluma
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home, sexually assaulted, and killed. Her fate was unknown for a month after she was
missing.116 The offender was a two-time violent offender who had been paroled. Had
Three Strikes been enacted, this offender would have likely been in prison.117 The
second case was the killing of 18 year-old Kimber Reynolds in Fresno. She was leaving
a restaurant and was shot by an assailant after she resisted the theft of her purse.118
Following her death, Kimber’s father, Mike Reynolds, proposed and advocated for the
ballot initiative, Proposition 184, entitled “Three Strikes and You’re Out.” Much of the
content of the provisions can be attributed to Reynolds. Both of these cases drew
immense public attention focusing on the inadequacy of the criminal justice system to
protect individuals against violent offenders.
The Klaas and Reynolds cases were emblematic of the larger trend of high violent
crime rates in the early 1990’s, both in California and nationwide. [Insert data from
packet] The public in California, in particular, wanted harsher sentencing, motivated in
part by Reynolds’ effort. Enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders was common in the
United States and England but was seldom used and deemed ineffective.119 Franklin
Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, in their book, Punishment and Democracy:
Three Strikes and You’re Out in California, emphasize that Three Strikes in California
was strikingly an “outside the beltway” policy due to its populism and separation from
the legislature.120 The California Correctional Peace Officer’s Association, a prison
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guard union and the National Rifle Association were two of the main supporters of
Reynolds’ proposal.121 The opposition consisted of groups such as the California
Probation, Parole, and Correctional Association.122 According to Zimring et al., the
Klaas case drove the public sentiment to support Three Strikes.
From the political side, Republican Governor Pete Wilson wanted to demonstrate
to voters that he was taking action to promote more “tough-on-crime” policies. Wilson
was particularly driven to appear “tough-on-crime” because he was facing reelection, a
weak state economy, and low approval ratings.123 The Democrat-controlled state
legislature did not want “to give the vulnerable governor an opportunity to make crime a
defining issue in his reelection campaign.”124 However, the Democrats and Wilson
ultimately “had swallowed whole the outside-the-beltway version of Three Strikes
because they were unwilling to concede the ground on ‘getting tough’ to the other side in
the political campaign to come.”125 Wilson chose the Proposition 184 version of Three
Strikes over the District Attorneys of California’s proposal which affected a narrower
group of felons and was perceived as soft on crime.126 His choice and both the legislative
and executive deferral to the populist account demonstrates the power of public opinion
in shaping legislation. This deferral stands out in California since government officials
usually alter or influence initiatives.127 Of course, the issue arose during an election year,
which exaggerated the influence of public opinion. It is still striking how an initiative
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prevailed over more expert-driven laws, though certain experts do approve of the Three
Strikes law.
The Three Strikes provisions were presented in the California voter guide of 1994
along with arguments for and against the proposition. Both the provisions and arguments
provide insight into the reasons for developing this law, from policy and philosophical
standpoints. There are four main provisions. First, there are increased sentences for
repeat felons. If one has been previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony, he
or she has a mandatory sentence of twice the term required for any new felony. Any new
felony refers to a broader category of offenses than serious or violent felonies. After two
serious or violent felonies, the mandatory sentence for any new felony is life
imprisonment with a minimum term of either 25 years or three times the statutory penalty
for the new offense, whichever is greater.128 Second, the initiative requires that serious
and violent crimes committed by a minor 16 years or older count as previous
convictions.129 Third, the law restricts credits that reduce time spent in prison to no more
than one-fifth of the time contrasted with the old standard of half time. This provision
also abolished credits for county jail time served before a state prison sentence.130
Fourth, the law eliminates alternatives to prison incarceration for second and third strike
felons, which removes the options of probation or drug treatment facilities.131
The arguments presented in favor of Proposition 184 open with the tragic story of
Kimber Reynolds.132 The proponents argue that Three Strikes targets career criminals
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and keeps them “behind bars where they belong.”133 Kimber Reynolds’s story is invoked
to emphasize how one of her assailants is only serving nine years, which seems
insufficient. The argument refers to the 80% of the time requirement, appealing to the
danger of the half-time credits for felons before the enactment of Three Strikes. On the
issue of cost, the proponents contend that each released felon costs taxpayers $20,000 in
losses to the victims and repeatedly putting criminals through the courts and prion
systems. The signatories on Proposition 184 include Mike Reynolds of Crime Victims
United, Jan Scully of Women Prosecutors of California, and Mike Huffington of 3
Strikes and You’re Out. The argument concludes with the phrase “3 STRIKES SAVES
LIVES AND TAXPAYER DOLLARS.”134
In the “Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 184,” the opposition first
emphasizes the cost to voters in increased prison spending due to the enhanced
sentencing. This spending, according to opponents, diverts resources from local schools,
hospitals, and police departments among other public agencies. They criticize
Proposition 184 for grouping nonviolent felons with violent criminals. Opponents
include certain state district attorneys and police officers. The rebuttal states that victims
will be less willing to report crimes like car break-ins because offenders could face life.
The Klaas family opposed this proposition. The signatories include James Fox, San
Mateo County District Attorney, Marlys Robertson, President of the League of Women
Voters, and Marc Klaas of the Polly Klaas Foundation.135 The “Argument Against
Proposition 184” echoes the opposition’s rebuttal. It cites the example of how a 50 year-
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old man who twice stole a bicycle as a teenager would face life in prison for writing a
bad check under Three Strikes. This example illustrates the opposition’s argument that
Three Strikes targets minor felonies and aging criminals who are no longer a threat, but
uses an extreme example of bicycle theft which would likely not be considered a serious
felony under three strikes.136 Finally, the proponent’s rebuttal states that 815,000
California voters have signed Proposition 184.137
The passage of Proposition 184 is striking on a theoretical level. The stories of
Klaas and Reynolds largely motivated Three Strikes, tapping into the discussion of
emotion and anger and their relation to punishment. During 1992, California experienced
its highest violent crime rate of 345,624 crimes.138 As points of contrast, in 1988, there
were 261, 912 violent crimes, and 207,879 in 1999.139 Mike Reynolds helped write
Proposition 184, which is an intriguing instance of a family member of a victim reacting
to the crime through legal means. Emotion is involved in the writing of the law and
advocacy for it given that Kimber’s story opens the argument in favor of the proposition.
Anger is represented differently than in Berns’s or Stephen’s accounts. These theorists
focus solely on anger’s connection to the moral community and upholding retributive
punishment. They do not focus on the utilitarian effects like Proposition 184 does. An
element of retribution motivates Three Strikes because of the argument that violent and
serious felons do not receive sufficient prison time without the sentence enhancement.
This is likely motivated by both a retributive sentiment and utilitarian calculation,
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depending on the particular proponent. Opponents likely believe that Three Strikes is
inconsistent with retribution since nonviolent and violent felons receive the same
sentence. In this case, it seems that a concern for public safety prevails over justice. This
discussion sheds light on the potential philosophical motivations of the voters. Since the
violent crime rate and the Klaas and Reynolds cases were heavily emphasized, voters
were likely most concerned with incapacitation rather than justice.
Incapacitation seems to be the guiding principle of this version of Three Strikes,
given the drastic sentence enhancements. Zimring et al. allege that the adoption of the
policy lacked principle and “is a penal practice without a theory” because of the grouping
of violent and nonviolent felons in the mandatory sentencing requirements.140 However,
he notes that “it may be that the only general principle in the statute is to increase the
seriousness of all punishments for those who had been convicted earlier of selected
felonies.”141 This principle resembles incapacitation and attempts to target those who are
most likely to recidivate and extend their sentences. Zimring et al. also argue that the
provisions of Three Strikes conflict, particularly that the consideration of prior offenses
contradicts the proportionality to the current offense.142 This conflict demonstrates
another key difference between Three Strikes and retributive thought. The consideration
of past record involves a utilitarian, predictive judgment on the likelihood of recidivism.
Such calculation diverges from retribution because that theory holds that punishments
should be maintained regardless of consequences.
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Three Strikes effectively removes the option of rehabilitation for felons, unless
they are deemed mentally ill. Thus, rehabilitation is limited to whatever rehabilitative
services are offered within state prisons. This opposition to rehabilitation likely stems
from two factors. First, the issue of effectiveness was important in the early 1990’s
because of the high violent crime rate. Expert policy had promoted rehabilitative
policies, which had failed to minimize crime rates. Three Strikes, however, was not the
beginning of this rejection of rehabilitation, as determinate sentencing represented a
prioritization of retribution. Second, the view of criminals as dangerous enough to
warrant life sentences stands at odds with rehabilitation since it considers inmates able to
reform. Under Three Strikes and similar policies, criminal sentencing is “a zero-sum
game between victims and offenders.”143 Rehabilitation is often perceived as catering to
the offender, which under this paradigm, is at odds with helping victims.
The more recent modifications to Three Strikes exhibit a shift in public opinion,
especially because they were enacted in the form of an initiative. The two relevant
changes are Proposition 36 from 2012 and Proposition 47 from 2014. The ballot
pamphlets from each year provide the supporting arguments and opposition, as well as
the specifics of the modifications to Three Strikes.
Proposition 36 reduces prison sentences for third strikers who have committed
non-serious or non-violent felonies.144 Instead of the mandatory 25-year sentence, these
individuals are required to serve twice the term for their crimes. Some drug, sex, or gunrelated offenses constitute exceptions to this class of exempted felons in the third strike
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class. 145 Proposition 36 provides for the resentencing of non-serious and non-violent
felons who had been sentenced to 25 years as their third strike. The above exceptions
apply and render those felons ineligible for resentencing.146
The “Argument in Favor of Proposition 36” combines practical and retributivist
considerations. The statement opens with the phrase, “make the punishment fit the
crime,” criticizing the grouping of non-violent and non-serious felons with the most
dangerous felons.147 From a practical perspective, proponents argue that the proposition
saves taxpayer money and reduces prison overcrowding. They note that despite the
change from Proposition 36, California would still maintain the toughest Three Strikes
law in the United States.148 Conversely, the opponents cite that a third strike conviction
emphasizes how a judge found the particular felon to be dangerous and deserving of the
25-year sentence. Proposition 36 would allow the release of these individuals under the
resentencing provision, without parole or supervision.149 Their assumption is that the
group of non-serious and non-violent felons was still recidivists posing a threat to
California. The sentiment in passing Proposition 36 indicates either an acceptance of the
cost-saving argument or a rejection of grouping all felons to receive one mandatory
sentence. Both reasons could have easily played a role in the passage of this proposition.
Proposition 47 is not explicitly about Three Strikes but changes the offenses
considered felonies, thereby affecting Three Strikes implementation. Specifically,
Proposition 47 reduces drug possession offenses and petty theft, receiving stolen
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property, and forging and/or writing bad checks if the amount in question is less than
$950 to misdemeanors.150 Individuals previously convicted of rape, child molestation,
murder, or registered sex offenders are exempt from the resultant decreased sentences.
The reasoning in favor of Proposition 47 mirrors those in favor of Proposition 47.
Proponents argue that the change prioritizes violent and serious felons over less serious
property and drug crimes and also cite the cost savings.151 Opponents contend that felons
with previous convictions of armed robbery, kidnapping, child abuse, and other crimes
will be exempted from sentence enhancements if they are later convicted of drug
possession or a property crime involving a value below $950.152 The statement notes that
guns often cost less than $950 so felony prosecution for gun theft would be eliminated.
The rebuttal responds by distinguishing gun crimes from theft. Opponents argue that
date-rape drugs are included in Proposition 47, while proponents argue that using daterape drugs to commit a felony constitutes a different offense than possession. Their
difference stems from a disagreement over whether possession of date-rape drugs is
inherently wrong.
Both propositions rely on cost-saving arguments, and this is an important issue
when considering philosophical implications of criminal punishment policy. The cost
issue potentially overrides the philosophical considerations or represents an equally
important consideration. The cost issue can refer to the actual or perceived cost of
incarceration. Since corrections costs are often significant within state budgets, making
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corrections policy more cost effective can improve fiscal health and allows more
resources for other areas.153 Rachel Barkow, in her article, “Federalism and the Politics
of Sentencing,” argues that the high costs of corrections sparks deliberation about the
merits of sentencing policies.154 She argues that a focus on the cost effectively
counteracts the fear surrounding crime, forcing voters to consider policies from a more
rational perspective. However, according to the California State Budget of 2013-2014,
Health and Human Services, K-12 Education, Transportation, and Higher Education all
receive more funding than Corrections and Rehabilitation.155 The cost of corrections is
significant, but not the largest expenditure. Often voters focus on the perceived expense
of incarceration.
The contrast between a rational consideration of costs and benefits and emotionbased fear of crime is intriguing. The previous divergence between utilitarian and
retributive theories on the question of emotions involved in criminal punishment occurs
similarly on a theoretical level. Retributivists like Berns accept the role of anger in
motivating response to crime. In the case of Three Strikes, anger motivated a utilitarian
policy, with which retributivists may find flaws, depending on their perspective on the
violent crime rates. The contrast between the theoretical accounts of retribution and
utilitarianism are not clearly represented in policy. Some elements of them are evident in
a mixed fashion, such as valuing both proportionality and cost in law. The cost element
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adds a variable not discussed by the previous theorists, but represents an important factor
in determining the utility of policies like Three Strikes.
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Chapter Six: Realignment
California’s Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, AB 109, is the shift of
lower-level offenders from state prisons to jails in response to California’s prison
overcrowding. Before Realignment, there were four main ways convicted individuals
could be sentenced: “straight probation, straight time in county jail, time in county jail
followed by a period of probation, or time in a state prison followed by a three year term
of parole.”156
Realignment, referring to AB 109, has four main provisions. First, certain
felonies “are punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or 2 or 3
years.”157 The exceptions to the felonies transferred to county jail are serious, violent,
and sexual. Individuals registered as sex offenders or those with prior convictions of
serious and violent felonies are also exempt from the diversion to county jails. The
categories of felons that can serve their sentences in county jails are often referred to as
“non-non-non” offenders. Before Realignment, these felons would all be sentenced to
state prison, but “AB 109 amended about 500 criminal statutes eliminating the possibility
of a state prison sentence upon conviction.”158 Second, Realignment enacts the
Postrelease Community Supervision Act (PCRS) of 2011, shifting the supervision of
“non-non-nons” from state parole agents to county probation departments.159 Individuals
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under the authority of PCRS include those whose prior convictions are serious, violent, or
sexual even if their current offense is not.160 Third, parole and probation violators serve
revocation terms in county jails rather than state prisons. The only exception to this
provision is for violators who have been released after serving an indeterminate life
sentence.161 Fourth, judges can split sentences for lower-level offenders into jail time and
probation time since there is no parole requirement.162 The sentence length is required to
remain the same. In this chapter, I will discuss the legal motivation for Realignment,
Supreme Court case Brown v. Plata, AB 109 and AB 117, and the reflection of
philosophical theories within the Realignment. My philosophical analysis of
Realignment will focus on a discussion of the sentence lengths, Governor Brown’s
statement, and county implementation of Realignment.
Brown v. Plata is significant in explaining the impetus for Realignment, as the
California State Government was mandated by the Supreme Court to fix its
unconstitutional conditions in state prisons caused by overcrowding. Plata began in 2001
and was filed in the Northern District of California by the Prison Law Office on behalf of
nine specific inmates and those generally in the custody of the California Department of
Corrections.163 In May 2011, a three-judge district court found that the state prison
overcrowding was a violation of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The three-judge court consisted of the Coleman v. Brown and Plata v.
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Brown District Judges, and a third Ninth Circuit Judge. This court was convened because
the judges were deciding an order to release prisoners under an Eighth Amendment
violation, which is “a power reserved to a three-judge district court, not a single-judge
district court.”164 Their ruling ordered the State to reduce its prison population to
137.5% of its capacity within two years.165 Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of
the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Roberts, Anthony Scalia, Samuel Alito, and
Clarence Thomas dissented. The majority opinion determined that the question to be
decided was whether the order issued by the three-judge court is consistent with the
statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995.166 PLRA is a congressional
statute concerning when prisoners can bring litigation against states. The order holds that
absent a plan to decrease overcrowding by states, prisoners must release some prisoners
before the completion of their full sentences.
Within the disagreement between Kennedy and the dissenting opinions, a
significant component of the discussion is dedicated to the three-judge court’s
jurisdiction under PLRA. This question is too broad to discuss in this chapter. Instead, I
will focus on Kennedy’s arguments about prison conditions and the violation of the
Eighth Amendment. He holds that “the degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons is
exceptional,” as prisons designed to house 80,000 inmates had populations of double
designed capacity.167 Severely inadequate medical and mental healthcare are frequently
cited as being particularly severe in California. Several examples illustrate the extreme
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inadequacy of care such as “a prisoner with severe abdominal pain [who] died after a 5week delay in referral to a specialist” and “a prisoner with ‘constant and extreme’ chest
pain died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor.”168 Overcrowding decreases
the quality of care, access to care, sanitation of medical facilities, and quality of medical
professionals. These negative conditions make attracting and retaining qualified medical
staff very difficult. The inhumane and unsafe results of overcrowding result in a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, according to the majority opinion. Kennedy notes
that “prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons” and “respect
for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.”169 Respecting dignity in turn requires that the state provide for the basic
needs of inmates while they are in custody. If the state fails to protect the constitutional
rights of prisoners, the courts must step in. However, Kennedy specifies that “Courts
must be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as
well as the need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced with
the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”170 The
phrase, “the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation,” is interesting
for the purpose of this thesis since Kennedy acknowledges the importance of these
interests in designing policy and even cautions against the Court’s involvement in state
policy.
Plata occurred concurrently as California’s legislative action to enact
Realignment. The Supreme Court decision was released in May 2011 after Governor
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Brown signed AB 109 into law. Realignment had been discussed in the legislature five
years before the Court’s decision.171 The original lawsuit began in 2001, and prison
overcrowding had been an ongoing problem. Extreme budgetary issues were also
important in motivating the enactment of Realignment. The Legislative Counsel’s
analysis states “this bill would state that it addresses the fiscal emergency declared by the
Governor by proclamation issued on January 20, 2011, pursuant to the California
Constitution.”172 California was experiencing an unprecedented financial crisis which
forced legislators to cut spending in the criminal justice system.173 Increasing the inmate
population in the state prison would require covering the health care costs of those
individuals. Healthcare spending within corrections had increased from 12.4 percent of
spending to 22.8 between 2010 and 2011.174
In the introduction of this chapter, I mentioned the main provisions of
Realignment, but there are some additional relevant components of AB 109. The
legislation enhances the discretion granted to county correctional administrators to
include voluntary home detention and involuntary home detention within the sentences of
any inmate in county jail.175 Time served in home detention qualifies as fulfilling an
individual’s mandatory jail time. AB 109 amends Section 1203.016 of the Penal Code to
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allow a broader range of individuals to receive a sentence including home detention.176
No correctional administrator, however, is required to impose this sentence. The bill
amends section 17.5 of the California Penal Code to read “California must reinvest its
criminal justice resources to support community-based corrections programs and
evidence-based practices that will achieve improved public safety returns on this state’s
substantial investment in its criminal justice system.”177 Finally, the bill imposes “a
state-mandated local program,” since the counties are responsible for developing plans to
implement the Realignment, house, and rehabilitate a new group of offenders.178
Governor Jerry Brown’s AB 109 signing message partially addresses the concern
that certain felons will be misplaced in county jails. The press release states that AB 109
will not permit any early releases of inmates currently serving in state prison or
placement of convicted sex offenders in county jails.179 Brown’s signing message
supports Realignment because the state prison system undergoing recidivism and
overcrowding “wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation, and
impedes local law enforcement supervision.”180 Brown’s motivations represent a
combination of spending and crime reduction and a desire to improve rehabilitation.
An examination of the sentence lengths as a result of Realignment provides
insight into its connection to punishment theories. Specifically, AB 109 alters
determinate sentencing law by replacing the combination of time in state prison and
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parole with three potential options.181 Before Realignment, one’s sentence may have
been three years in state prison followed by three years of parole. The new options are,
three years in county jail with no post-release supervisory period, a split sentence
between jail and probation, or felony probation in which the sentences are “suspended
and replaced by post-release supervision.”182
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The shift from determinate sentencing could reflect desert-based concerns about
the severity of sentences for “non-non-nons.” Split sentences and felony probation allow
convicted individuals to spend more time outside of prison or jail, constituting a less
severe penalty than pre-Realignment. The increased probability of receiving probation
may reflect a more rehabilitative attitude since individuals can readjust to their home and
community lives instead of being incarcerated. However, a final motivation could be
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fiscal and practical in that shorter sentences will reduce overcrowding and be cheaper (at
least in the short term).
The specifics of the county plans and stakeholder views provide greater insight
into the interplay between rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. Joan Petersilia
interviewed stakeholders and presents her findings in “Voices from the Field: How
California Stakeholders View Public Safety Realignment.” I will present some of these
findings and explain how they relate to the theories of punishment. Probation officers
generally held favorable attitudes towards Realignment and “spoke with the most unified
voice” in contrast with other groups.184 AB 109 expands probation so that it is a greater
part of lower-level offenders’ sentences. Probation officers “unequivocally felt that
Realignment gave them an opportunity to fully test whether well-tailored rehabilitation
services can keep lower-level felony offenders from committing new crimes and
returning to prison.”185 This statement contains rehabilitative sentiments, given that
probation within the community is better funded and more widely used for lower-level
offenders under Realignment. Rehabilitation is supported in the context of “non-nonnons” rather than all offenders. The “test” aspect of this statement indicates that
rehabilitation is mainly one intention of these officers rather than results supported by
empirics. Public defenders noted “that treatment was either unavailable or not intensive
enough for the most serious offenders” within counties.186 However, probation officers
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criticized how only 25% of offenders receive split sentences under Realignment, meaning
that probation is not a part of their sentence.187
Prosecutors represent the least supportive group of Realignment, often motivated
by concerns of decreased incapacitation. For example, “Steve Cooley, three-term former
Los Angeles County District Attorney, was perhaps the most vocal in his criticism,
calling Realignment a ‘public safety nightmare.’”188 The nightmare refers to the ability
of the California criminal justice system to keep dangerous criminals incapacitated. The
prosecutors believe that the “non-non-non” category still encompasses felonies that
should be in state prison such as commercial burglary and vehicular manslaughter.189
Further, technical violations do not result in jail time under Realignment. The
prosecutors’ views are influenced by incapacitation. Retribution could play a role since
the prosecutors specified offenses that ought to receive harsher penalties.
Local police officers in many counties were overwhelmed by their additional
burden from Realignment, especially due to concurrent budget cuts.190 Police believed
crime reduction had occurred due to their efforts in community policing, but they were
stretched thin because of Realignment’s diversion of offenders to their locales.191 These
sentiments reflect concerns about deterrence because police presence and targeted
patrolling decreases crime. The alleged shift from Realignment prevented such intense
targeting, potentially increasing crime according to police officers. Sheriffs were more
divided on the issue, but noted that California’s high recidivism and prison as a
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“revolving door” had remained problems, warranting change. Many sheriffs worried
about the diversion of overcrowding to county jails, which could lead to the same issues
in Plata.192
Judges represent another important group of stakeholders since they impose the
sentences outlined by Realignment’s guidelines. Some judges in counties that have
focused more on rehabilitative programs view Realignment more favorably since “these
judges have experience working with probation and community treatment specialists to
provide services to offenders with mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence
issues.”193 One judge noted that judges have wider discretion to manage offenders’
treatment and compliance post-sentencing. However, this discretion is limited due to
counties lacking the community-based resources to implement these sentences.194 The
decrease in the determinacy of sentencing, at least for “non-non-nons” could bring up
similar conflicts surrounding the debate over indeterminate sentencing in the late 1970’s.
The increased discretion, combined with potentially inadequate rehabilitation, could
incite criticism on arbitrary sentences and recidivism rates. Petersilia cautions that “it is
important to remind ourselves that California current system of determinate sentencing
was adopted in 1977 in part to rid the state of racial biases and geographical differences
that were evident in its former highly discretionary indeterminate sentencing law.”195
Rehabilitation and deterrence models both seek to decrease crime, but stakeholders often
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grow wary of rehabilitative experiments and return to traditional models. Realignment
could experience this problem if county services are not improved.
An assessment of the county plans provides an added and similar insight to
Petersilia’s stakeholder interviews. According to Sara Abarbanel’s study of county
implementation plans, some counties were enthusiastic, but all were concerned about
inadequate funding from the state.196 In terms of alternative sanctions, “the highest
percentage of counties that mention they plan to use them are electronic or GPS
monitoring pre- or post-sentence (96 percent), flash incarceration (72 percent), work
release (71 percent), day reporting centers (52 percent), community service (48 percent),
and drug courts (38 percent).”197 Certain counties will institute these sanctions for “nonnon-nons” more frequently than others based on funding and existence of community
based programs. The county plan language, especially in counties like Santa Cruz,
indicates a favorable attitude towards rehabilitation.
Ultimately, Realignment represents a partial and limited shift towards
rehabilitation for certain lower-level offenders dependent on county resources and
discretion. The ideal differs from practice in many counties. Moreover, the maintenance
of deterrence and retribution at the state prison level indicates a different view of higherlevel offenders, despite some debate on which felonies should be included in the “nonnon-non” category.

196

Sara Abarbanel, Angela McCray, Kathryn McCann Newhall, and Jessica Snyder, “Realigning the
Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 2011-2012 Implementation Plans” Stanford
Criminal Justice Center, 2013 http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates%20for%2058
%20counties%20080113.pdf
197
Sara Abarbanel et al, “Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109
2011-2012 Implementation Plans,” 18

76

Conclusion
The combination of the philosophical perspective on the theories of punishment
and these policies provides a more insightful angle than viewing each in isolation. The
main insights derived from this thesis relate to human nature, the differences between
legislators and voters and the importance of a mixed theory.
In the Laws of Plato, the Athenian stranger observes that the laws are not
designed for gods and instead designed for flawed humans. The fairly pessimistic
account of human nature shapes almost all theories of punishment. The distinction
between gods and humans implies that humans are flawed, and some will necessarily
commit crimes, despite the existence of laws. However, a punitive criminal law must
exist to guide conduct and ensure the public safety. There is an important category of
people that will abstain from crime because of laws because they view the costs of
getting caught as too high. The assumption about human nature is even present in
Menninger’s account. Viewing crime as a disease implies some flaw about those
individuals.
The three case studies all demonstrate the legislators’ commitment to utilitarian
concerns. In determinate sentencing and Three Strikes, the increasing violent crime rate
was a major consideration for legislators. More specifically, the effectiveness of policies
is measured by the decrease in recidivism and overall crime. The public often shares this
attribute of the legislature. The insights of J.L. Mackie and Walter Berns on the natural
impulse towards retribution provide an intriguing caveat. If individuals are inherently
predisposed to seek justice, this also motivates their advocacy of certain policies. The
example of Three Strikes and Proposition 47 is useful here. Some voters may have
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supported Three Strikes because they believe repeat offenders deserve harsher
punishment. Similar logic can be applied to Proposition 47, as some of its proponents
believe punishments for petty theft and drug possession were undeservedly severe.
Ripstein mixed theory in part answers the dichotomy between the citizens’ beliefs. His
theory holds that serious criminals deserve harsh punishment, but that effectiveness is
also important to guarantee justice.
A mixed theory is less useful in the dilemma over rehabilitation for lower-level
offenders. Rehabilitation’s acceptance hinges on its effectiveness as demonstrated in the
shift to determinate sentencing and in negative reactions to Realignment. Since there is
no theoretical basis for rehabilitation, it is difficult to justify without appealing to its
consequences. Conversely, one could support retribution by making an argument
premised upon desert. Lorraine Smith Pangle’s proposal supports reformative education
to address deeper problems with offenders’ character. However, Pangle’s theory is not
reflected in actual policy making it difficult to justify in that manner. If rehabilitation in
practice could be altered to mirror Pangle’s approach, it could be supported as a principle
rather than entirely based on its effectiveness.
The stakeholders involved in the punishment process render it a uniquely
emotional experience. Beyond the victims, offenders, and relevant family and friends,
the other people determining policy often represent invested parties. For example,
sheriffs, police officers, and criminal law attorneys have experience witnessing crimes
and interacting with both victims and offenders. The recognition of emotions as essential
elements of theory is important given this personal context of criminal punishment.
Though theories can be divorced from empirical reality, Berns and Mackie recognize the
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importance of emotions within retribution. Instead of classifying emotions as external to
the theory and punishment process, anger expresses a sense of morality in that serious
actions receive the appropriate emotional reaction. This emotional element accords with
reality, as one can easily imagine feeling enraged if a murder occurred to a friend or even
acquaintance. The absence of emotion would be strange in this situation. Perhaps,
rehabilitation is motivated by compassion for criminals, though that is not explicitly
mentioned within the main arguments for rehabilitation. Hearing about the harsh prison
conditions, long sentences, and socio-economic backgrounds of many offenders could
influence people to support rehabilitation on a partially emotional basis. The emotions
surrounding deciding someone’s fate through the punishment process make these
instances of theory and policy incredibly intriguing.
Ultimately, philosophy does not shape policy, but instances of philosophy having
an impact on policy exist in these case studies. The compromising nature of the
legislative process, empirical realities of crime, and public opinion prevent a punishment
system entirely based on one theory. The mixed theory can be used to counterbalance the
extremes of one theory such as a concern for rights trumping utility to prevent
punishment of the innocent. Theoretically, there are some inconsistencies when mixing
the theories. For example, the minimum punishment required to achieve deterrence could
be compromised because it does not satisfy the retributive demand of harsh punishment
for serious offenses. It is important to have philosophical reflection about public policy
to truly understand the origins of laws or find flaws with them. Even if Socrates’
observation that individuals cannot voluntarily commit crimes cannot be incorporated to
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public policy, it provides an indication that questioning the foundations of punishment is
important.
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